International business negotiation strategies based on bargaining power assessment: the case of attracting investments by Peleckis, Kęstutis
Copyright © 2016 Vilnius Gediminas Technical University (VGTU) Press
Journal of Business Economics and Management
ISSN 1611-1699 / eISSN 2029-4433
2016 Volume 17(6): 882–900
doi:10.3846/16111699.2016.1233511
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES 
BASED ON BARGAINING POWER ASSESSMENT:  
THE CASE OF ATTRACTING INVESTMENTS
Kęstutis PELECKIS
Department of International Economics and Business Management, Vilnius Gediminas 
Technical University, Sauletekio al. 11, LT–10223 Vilnius, Lithuania
E-mail: k.peleckis@vgtu.lt (corresponding author)
Received 23 May 2016; accepted 04 September 2016 
Abstract. At present business solutions are used for development and implementation 
of negotiating strategies for international business, which are not universally suitable for 
business development in all situations in context of globalization, with current challenges, 
which are characterized by increasing risk, uncertainty and cultural differences. The pur-
pose of the research is to provide a theoretical model for developing and implementing 
international business negotiation strategies, based on bargaining power assessment, as 
well as to conduct an experiment and test the suitability and adaptability of the developed 
model in an international business negotiation situation – in case of attracting invest-
ments. Research methods – scientific literature analysis, comparative, logical analysis 
and synthesis, comparative and generalisation methods, mathematical and statistic data 
analysis methods. According to the results, the developed model can be used to reinforce 
international business negotiations and electronic business negotiations, as an independent 
systemic unit of the negotiation process (a measure that is autonomous or requires only 
partial intervention of the negotiator). 
Keywords: negotiations, bargaining power, atracting investment, bargaining power as-
sessment, strategic decisions, negotiation support.
JEL Classification: M16, M54.
Introduction 
Contemporary business world has to encounter a huge variety of different cultures and 
their specifics, which requires adequate theoretical solutions for international business 
organisation and management. International business development under global condi-
tions involves conducting business negotiations participated by representatives from 
all kinds of different cultures. This poses additional difficulties in developing strategic 
solutions and ensuring their support. Therefore, there is an obvious demand for adequate 
negotiation models, which take into the account the potential of the negotiating par-
ties – their bargaining power. 
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This article examines a model proposed by the author, the purpose of which is to help 
develop international business negotiation strategies, based on the assessment of bar-
gaining power. This model will be tested in a typical international business negotiation 
environment – attracting investments. The model is based on the use of the game theory 
in order to find an optimum negotiation strategy and adapt the optimisation rules for 
international business negotiations in case of uncertainty. The purpose of this model is 
to develop and implement international business negotiation strategies based on bargain-
ing power assessment, the analysis of strategic actions and strategic decision-making. 
The complexity and systematic nature of negotiation issues determines the necessity to 
consider the abundance of situations, processes and the criteria for evaluating negotia-
tion potential. Here we will employ a multi-criteria analysis by using experts. Accor-
ding to the results, the developed model can be used to reinforce international business 
negotiations and electronic business negotiations, as an independent systemic unit of the 
negotiation process (a measure that is autonomous or requires only partial intervention 
of the negotiator). The problem is that management, as well as business management 
theory does not provide any theoretical solutions for evaluating bargaining power du-
ring international business negotiations, especially considering the possibilities of using 
negotiation support technology, which is rather important for international business 
development. The object of this research is the support for developing international 
business negotiation strategies, based on bargaining power assessment. The purpose of 
the research is to provide a theoretical model for developing and implementing inter-
national business negotiation strategies, based on bargaining power assessment, as well 
as to conduct an experiment and test the suitability and adaptability of the developed 
model in an international business negotiation situation – in case of attracting invest-
ments. Research methods – scientific literature analysis, comparative, logical analysis 
and synthesis, comparative and generalisation methods, mathematical and statistic data 
analysis methods.
1. A model for developing an international business negotiation strategy, 
based on bargaining power assessment
In our opinion, the development and implementation of negotiation strategies should 
be based on bargaining power assessment. However, the process of getting to know 
the situation may take place during the negotiation process, thus strategic tactics and 
actions (steps) may change on each new issue examined during the negotiations. The 
analysis of scientific literature (Ginevičius et al. 2014; Tamošiūnas 2011; Zavadskas 
et al. 2004) shows, that the application of heuristic algorithms in developing and im-
plementing negotiation strategies in order to assess bargaining power and reflect on the 
process of negotiation itself, is rather promising. We will define a condition, that each 
negotiation issue will be examined only once, without coming back to it. The purpose 
of the heuristic algorithm will be to find the negotiating strategies-payoffs that bring 
the greatest total benefit for the negotiation process. In order to find them we will use 
various optimisation rules proposed by various scientists (Hurwitz, Wald, Savage and 
Niehaus, Bernoulli-Laplace, Bayes-Laplace, Hodges and Lehmann). We will arrange 
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the negotiation issues from the most important to the least important, in order to make 
sure that the further course of the negotiations will not be in vain, e.g. to avoid situa-
tions of finding out that the other side of the negotiations is unable to implement the 
main criterion at the end of the negotiations (e.g. no one in the negotiation team has 
the authority to sign an agreement or a contract), thus making the entire negotiation a 
waste of time and effort. 
The purpose of optimisation is rather complicated, because the individual most be-
neficial payoffs of the primary negotiation issues will not necessarily make the most 
beneficial aggregated payoff of all of the negotiation issues, which means that it is 
necessary to search for the most beneficial aggregated payoff of the entire negotiation 
process, i.e. to solve the issue of global optimisation. Example: certain negotiations 
revolve around three issues and each of these issues have several alternative solutions; 
although the payoffs of the first two issues were not very beneficial, choosing them has 
led to the best payoff of the third question, which results in the most beneficial possible 
final payoff of the entire negotiation process.
Having defined the priority list of our negotiation issues, note that each of the negotia-
tion issues involves negotiating with a set of potential negotiation partners. Let’s make 
that set a definite number, consisting of t alternatives for each of the issues. Let’s mark 
the alternatives of the issue i as bi,j, j = 1, 2, 3, …, ti. Then we will mark the set of all 
the alternatives for the issue i as ,1 ,2 ,,{ } , ,= … ii i i i tw b b b , while w1× w2 × w3, …, wn is the 
set of all possible negotiation scenarios, when each of the issues involves choosing one 
possible alternative, where n is the number of the negotiation issues.
Having marked the beginning of the negotiation with a b0, we can illustrate the entire 
process as a tree graph (Fig. 1), where the branch , iji bH marks the payoff of choosing 
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where: H – the outcome of the negotiator’s negotiation issue according to the chosen 
optimisation rule (Hurwitz, Wald, Werner, etc.); n – the number of the negotiation issues 
(the subscript and superscript mark the beginning and the end of the negotiation issue).
The superscript b0 marks the beginning of the issue, the subscript bij marks the alterna-
tive j of the issue i, while the branch , iji bH marks the payoff of choosing the alternative 
j as the solution to the issue i, j ∈ w1×w2×w3, …, wn.
Further on we will use the Hurwitz formula in order to achieve the best payoff of the 
negotiator’s negotiation issue wih the following uncertainties:
 
( )max min 1 max = γ + − γ  u uz uzzu zH a a (the best maximum solution);  (2)
 
( )min max 1 min = γ + − γ  u uz uzu zzH a a (the best minimum solution),   (3)
where: H – the payoff of the negotiator’s negotiation issue according to Hurwitz rule; 
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auz – the payoff of the negotiator, which could be achieved upon making a move u if 
the opponent makes the move z. 
The set of the negotiator’s moves is finite and consists of the number of s moves, which 
will be numbered as u = 1, 2, 3, …, s.
We assume that the set of the possible moves of the opponent is finite and consists of 
k moves. We number these moves as z = 1, 2, 3, …, k.
g – the parameter of hope. g – the coefficient, changing from 0 to 1. According to the 
formula, if g = 1, then the Hurwitz criterion equals with Waldo, i.e. the pessimistic cri-
terion. If g = 0, the solution is optimistic, i.e. it allows to achieve the maximum payoff. 
The size of the coefficient g depends on which solution – optimistic or pessimistic – will 
be chosen by the negotiator. Perhaps the most acceptable coefficient for him would be 
g = 0.5, because this refers to choosing the middle between the pessimistic and opti-
mistic. This game could be expressed in the so called payoff matrix and referred to as 
the matrix game. The form of the zero sum game:
  G = {S1, S2; A}. (4)
As we apply it for negotiation issues, we could say that the set of the first negotiator’s 
strategies (pure strategies) is S1 ={ S11, S12, …, S1s} while the set of the second nego-
tiator’s pure strategies is S2 ={ S21, S22, …, S2k}S1 and S2 They are finite and defined. 
The function of the payoffs is A = ||auz||sxk . The set of the negotiator’s moves is finite 
and consists of the number of s moves, which will be numbered as u = 1, 2, 3, …, s. 
We assume that the set of the possible moves of our opponent is finite and consists of 
k moves: z = 1, 2, 3, …, k. 
The payoff matrix is used in order to find the most beneficial strategy to solve the ne-
gotiation issue. Each finite game has a solution related to pure or mixed strategies and 
the pure value of the solution can be expressed as the following: a ≤ n ≤ b. 
If a = b = v then the solution with clear strategies is the saddle point (only one optimal 
strategy for each player).
The number a is referred to as the lowest game value, b – the highest game value, v is 
referred to as the pure game value or the game value.
The application of the game theory for solving specific issues requires non-dimensional 
performance indicator values, which should indicate the ratio with the optimum value 
and be independent from the matrix type. We will use the exponential expression of the 
simple additive weighing (SAW) method by applying different exponents for the cases 
of the best minimum and best maximum criterion values, when the normal values are 































c  is favourable.  (6)
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We will use the latter formula to normalise the indices of the negotiation issues, in order 
to facilitate the processing of the negotiation results and obtain comparative values.
As we have the primary data about the importance of the indices of the negotiation 
issues, it is necessary to determine the significance of the indices that characterise the 
negotiation issues (Ginevičius et al. 2014; Ginevičius et al. 2008; Lova et al. 2000; 
Mandow, Pérez de la Cruz 2003; Wibowo, Deng 2013; Azar 2014). The significance of 
the indices indicate how many times the usefulness of the index of one or another nego-
tiation issue is larger (smaller) than the usefulness of another index. Keeping in mind the 
significance of the indices of the negotiation issues, we can define each of their values 
as follows (Ginevičius, Podvezko 2008a; Ginevičius, Podvezko 2008b; Ginevičius et al. 
2008; Stewart et al. 2013; Ehtamo et al. 2001; Martín Ramos et al. 2010; Lourenzutti, 
Krohling 2014; Chang, Wu 2011; Azar 2014; Keršulienė 2008):
1. choosing the most significant index of the negotiation issue – ager;
2. assigning 1 point for the best value of the negotiation issue (ager = 1);
3. determining the percentage (qv) of how much the remaining indices (bv) are worst 
than the best option (ager = 1);
4. assigning relative values to the index values (av = 1 – qv /100);
5. the relative values of all of the indices (qv) recalculated in a manner to make their 
sum equal to one:
 1







The multi-criteria assessment will be used in the application of game theory, when the 
negotiation issue involves examining more than one index. We will use the value of 
these normalised indices in the matrix game in order to find the payoff of the negotiation 
issue. The negotiation process can be illustrated in a graph (Fig. 1). The superscript b0 
marks the beginning of the issue, the subscript bij marks the alternative j of the issue 
i, while the branch , iji bH  
marks the payoff of choosing the alternative j as the solution 
to the issue i. Below you will see a global optimisation problem for a fixed number of 
negotiation issues, scheduled to be examined right before the negotiations.
Fig. 1. Graph of negotiations 
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Table 1 provides a theoretical model of an international business negotiation strategy, 
based on bargaining power assessment. The model provides a bargaining power assess-
ment for three subjects: the negotiator, the negotiator’s opponent and the negotiator’s 
competitor. The bargaining power of these subjects will be assessed according to their 
significance in the negotiator’s strategy, which is based on bargaining power assessment. 
These subjects directly influence the decision-making in creating a negotiation strategy.
Table 1. International business negotiation strategy and the preparation of the theoretical model 
based on bargaining power assessment 
Interested parties Negotiator Negotiator’s opponent Negotiator’s competitor
No. The sequence  
of applying 
algorithm formulas
Mathematical expressions of the algorithm
1 Peldschus  
non-linear 
normalisation of 

































the indices of the 
negotiation issue.
• Choosing the most significant index of the negotiation issue – ager;
• Assigning the best value of the negotiation issue to 1 point (ager = 1);
• Determining the percentage (qv) of how much the remaining indices 
(av) are worst than the best option (ager = 1);
• Assigning relative values to index values av = 1 – qv/100);
• The relative values of all of the indices (qv) recalculated in a manner 








q v  m.
3 Solving the game 
matrix in order 
to find the most 
beneficial strategy 
for finding the 
solution to the 
negotiation issue. 
The form of the zero sum game:
G = {S1, S2; A}.
As we apply it for negotiation issues, we could say that the set of the 
first negotiator’s strategies (pure strategies) is 
S1 ={ S11, S12, …, S1s} while the set of the second negotiator’s pure 
strategies is S2 ={ S21, S22, …, S2k}. S1 and S2 are finite and defined. 
The function of the payoffs is A = ||auz||sxk. 
The set of the negotiator‘s moves is finite and consists of the number 
of s moves, which will be numbered as u = 1, 2, 3, …, s.
We will assume that the set of the possible moves of the opponent is 
finite and consists of k moves. We will number these moves as z = 1, 
2, 3, …, k.
Each finite game has a solution related to pure or mixed strategies and 
the pure value can be expressed as follows:
a ≤ n ≤ b.
If a = b = v, then the solution with clear strategies is the saddle point 
(only one optimal strategy for each player).
The number a is referred to as the lowest game value, b – the highest 
game value, v is referred to as the pure game value or the game value.
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4 Using optimum 
rules in order 
to obtain the 
maximum payoff 
for the negotiation 
issue (using the 
Hurwitz rule as an 
example).
max min 1( )max = γ + − γ  u uz uzzu z
H a a the best maximum solution);
min max 1( )min = γ + − γ  u uz uzu zz
H a a the best minimum solution),
where H – the payoff of the negotiator‘s negotiation issue according to 
Hurwitz rule; auz – the payoff of the negotiator, which could be achieved 
upon making a move u if the opponent makes the move z. 
The set of the negotiator’s alternative moves is finite and consists of the 
number of s moves, which will be numbered as u = 1, 2, 3, …, s.
We will assume that the set of the possible moves of the opponent is 
finite and consists of k moves. We will number these moves as z = 1, 
2, 3, …, k.
g – the parameter of hope. g – the coefficient, changing from 0 to 1.
5 Solving the 
optimisation 
problem in order 
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where: H – the payoff of the negotiator’s negotiation issue according to 
the Hurwitz rule; n – the number of the negotiation issues (the subscript 
and superscript mark the beginning and the end of the negotiation issue).
Having marked the beginning of the negotiation with a b0, we can 
illustrate the entire process as a tree graph (Fig. 1), where the branch 
, iji bH marks the payoff of choosing the alternative j in solving the issue i:
k ∈ w1×w2×w3, …, wn. 
Having defined the priority list of our negotiation issues, note that each 
of the negotiation issues involves negotiating with a set of potential 
negotiation partners. Let’s make that set a definite number, consisting 
of t alternatives for each of the issues. Let’s mark the alternatives of 
the issue i as bi, j, j = 1, 2, 3, …, ti. Then we will mark the set of all 
the alternatives for the issue i as ,1 ,2 ,,{ } , ,= … ii i i i tw b b b while w1×w2×w3, 
…, wn is the set of all possible negotiation scenarios, when each of the 
issues involves choosing one possible alternative, where n is the number 
of the negotiation issues.
6 The comparison 
of the bargaining 
power assessment 
and making the 
decision.
International business negotiation strategy based on bargaining power 
assessment.
Source: composed by the author.
In the model the bargaining power assessment of all negotiation subjects and the prepa-
ration of the strategy is conducted as follows: a non-linear normalisation of the indices 
of the negotiation issue; multi-criteria assessment of the indices of the negotiation issue; 
using game matrix to obtain the most beneficial strategy for the negotiation issue; using 
optimum rules in order to obtain the maximum payoff of the negotiation issue; solving 
the optimisation problem in order to obtain the maximum negotiation payoff; finally, 
performing a comparative analysis of the bargaining power assessments and making 
the decision. 
End of Table 1
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We will use the developed model for preparing negotiation strategies to prepare inter-
national business negotiation strategies based on bargaining power assessment. This 
strategy-making model will later be applied in solving complex negotiation issues and 
problems. We will examine if the developed model is effective in supporting interna-
tional business negotiations in cases of attracting investment.
2. The empirical study methodology for the application and assessment  
of the model for preparing international business negotiation strategies 
based on bargaining power assessment
The purpose of this paper is to conduct an empirical study to analyse the preparation of 
international business negotiation strategies based on bargaining power assessment in 
a typical field of business negotiations – attracting investments. In order to apply and 
test the model for preparing international business negotiation strategies based on bar-
gaining power assessment, this study is necessary, because it may show the application 
opportunities and test its major parameters.
The empirical study involves the following research methods: logical analysis, forming 
logical conclusions, comparison, generalisation methods; mathematical and statistical 
data analysis methods are used to process and analyse the data obtained during the 
empirical study, the statistical analysis of the data was performed using the SPSS (Sta-
tistical Package for the Social Sciences) software. The methods of the game theory (Xu 
et al. 2012; Peña et al. 2014; Cevikel, Ahlatçıoğlu 2010; Panda, Das 2014; Zavadskas 
et al. 2004; Apynis 2007; Žilinskas 2007) and the multi-criteria assessment are used in 
order to evaluate the bargaining power of the business subjects participating at specific 
international business negotiations in order to choose efficient international business 
negotiation strategies. The assessment was performed using the MathLab software.
The study raised the following hypotheses: 
H1:  The practice of international business negotiations lacks tendencies and opportu-
nities for substantial and adequate assessment of the bargaining power of various 
business subjects, taking into account the contemporary international and multi-
cultural business environment, as well as the demands and opportunities of remote 
negotiation technology and electronic business development. 
H2:  International business negotiation strategies based on bargaining power assessment 
achieve better negotiation results, compared to negotiations that are not based on 
the bargaining power assessment.
We will attempt to prove the first (H1) and second (H2) hypotheses by analysing the 
preparation of international business negotiation strategies based on bargaining power 
assessment in a typical field of business negotiations – attracting investments.
The empirical study is focused on searching for the major parameters of the model and 
supporting its application opportunities. 
The case of attracting investments is the most common situation in international busi-
ness negotiations. The study is conducted according to the specifics of this field. After 
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we test the suitability of this model for this typical case, we could discuss further stud-
ies on the application of this model in other areas. This study includes the methods of 
the game theory, using a heuristic algorithm (Lova et al. 2000; Mandow, Pérez de la 
Cruz 2003; Wibowo, Deng 2013; Azar 2014; Tamošiūnas 2011) and a multi-criteria 
assessment.
Multi-criteria assessment of negotiation issues involves using expert knowledge of each 
appropriate field. The subjects participating at the negotiations examined in this pa-
per and their negotiation objects illustrate a typical case of business negotiations. The 
specific data of the negotiation subjects and objects are confidential in order to refrain 
from revealing their commercial secrets; therefore the availability of this study data is 
limited. However, the data that is available will be sufficient to illustrate the research 
process and results. 
In order to test the model, the empirical study would benefit from using the methods 
of the game theory, because this enables to analyse the interaction of the objects that 
have their own individual objections. This is particularly important during international 
business negotiations, which involve interactions between people representing differ-
ent cultures and thus resulting in a number of uncertainties. In order to develop an 
international business negotiation strategy based on the negotiators’ bargaining power 
assessment, it would be beneficial to use the methods of the game theory that help to 
develop a model for creating a successful strategy. The game theory is defined as the 
entirety of methods for examining conflict situations and its purpose is to develop rec-
ommendations that enable the conflicting parties to make rational decisions (Bivainis 
2011). We can apply the methods of the game theory if we can predict the options of 
the negotiating parties by analysing each of the options of each of the negotiating par-
ties (Keršulienė 2008). Of course, in some cases of negotiations the game theory can-
not always provide a full definition of the decision-making process; however, practice 
shows that the application of the methods of the game theory is a great tool, which helps 
to make reasonable and appropriate strategic solutions. In many business negotiations 
negotiators have to make their decisions with a number of uncertainties. Of course, the 
purpose of bargaining power assessment is to reduce this information deficit; however 
it’s impossible to eliminate it due to the large number of variables. Therefore, we can 
use various optimum strategy calculation rules. 
3. The preparation of international business negotiation strategies based  
on bargaining power assessment in case of attracting investments
This study examines the preparation of international business negotiation strategies 
based on bargaining power assessment in case of attracting investments. This will en-
able to check, if the model for developing negotiation strategies and its algorithm are 
suitable for supporting business negotiations based on bargaining power assessment. 
The cases of attracting investment have been examined by the following researchers: 
Soboleva et al. (2015), Krishtal and Lisovskaya (2015), Alexander and Matthias (2012), 
Tvaronavičienė and Lankauskienė (2011), Šimelytė and Antanavičienė (2014). Further 
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on we conducted a bargaining power assessment of the interested subjects, which will 
be used in developing a strategy. In the study participated four business subjects. The 
participants and the context of the negotiations will be defined further on.
The situation and its context. One of the negotiating parties is searching for a factory 
producing luxurious bathroom and plumbing accessories for the purpose of selling them 
in Lithuania. This requires investments into opening and maintaining retail outlets in 
Vilnius, Kaunas and Klaipėda, including compensations for the exposition costs.
Interested parties:
Party 1 – the opponent. The opponent is one of the major Italian producers of bathroom 
and plumbing accessories. He has retailers in Lithuania. This partner is unsatisfied with 
the sales volumes of the current retailers and thus is searching for alternatives.
Party 2 – the negotiation subject in need of negotiation support. The negotiation sub-
ject is a Lithuanian retailer of bathroom and plumbing accessories, but so far he has 
been selling only economy-class products. He would like to start distributing goods for 
another client segment. However, his current premises are unsuitable. He has a huge 
experience of successful business. The negotiation payoffs will be evaluated based on 
this subject.
Party 3 – the competitor of the opponent. This is a relatively new Italian producer of 
bathroom and plumbing accessories; however, his investment possibilities are not as 
good as that of the Party 1. This party has been intensively looking for a partner in 
Lithuania. 
Party 4 – the competitor of the opponent. This Italian producer of bathroom and plum-
bing accessories has been successfully selling luxurious bathroom accessories in Lithu-
ania, but he would like to sell more than one manufacturer’s goods.
The negotiation payoffs will be evaluated based on the business subject purchasing the 
goods. This international negotiation involves negotiating with other business subjects 
(formula 1). The criteria for evaluating the offers of other business subjects: delivery 
time (in months), price (euros), the risk of late payments (%). The results of the delivery 
time, price and risk of late payments will be minimised (formula 5). The significance of 
the criteria for evaluating the negotiation issues will be determined by a team of experts 
(ten experts working in the field of attracting investments – project managers, mana gers, 
intermediaries and clients). The compatibility of the expert opinions is determined ac-
cording to a concordance coefficient (Appendix 2, formulas 16–19). Then we outline the 
normalised solution matrices (formulas 5–6) according to the significance of the criteria 
and calculate the total value of the alternatives. Another step would be to compare the 
game outcome by adapting different optimisation rules (formula 4 and Appendix 2, 
formulas 7–15). We chose the following rules (Appendix 2, formulas 7–15): Hurwitz, 
Wald, Savage and Niehaus, Bernoulli-Laplace, Bayes-Laplace, Hodges and Lehmann. 
Accordingly, based on the applicable optimisation rules, we adopted the same output 
data for all rules: the coefficient of hope equals 0.5; the probability of the event – 0.25. 
Each subject provides 4 alternative proposals. However, the accuracy of the negotiation 
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results depends on the possibly insufficient information. Therefore, in order to reduce 
the negative influence of the lack of information, we used the data of the business sub-
jects’ creditworthiness. The initial assessment data of the negotiation offers is provided 
in the Appendix 1. It involves choosing the optimum criteria and, accordingly, selecting 
the best indices. The assessment of the importance of the negotiation issues involves 
using expert opinions. The results of the expert group’s assessment of the importance of 
the indices are provided in the Tables A.1 and A.2 of the Appendix 1. The compatibility 
of the expert opinions – the concordance coefficients (Appendix 2, formulas 16–19) are 
satisfactory. The next step involves providing normalised solution matrices (formulas 
5–6) with adapted criteria significance. Tables A.3–A.5 (Appendix 1) provide game mat-
rices that are normalised according to the significance of the criteria (formula 4). Figure 
2 illustrates the comparison of the game results by adapting different optimisation rules. 
The diagrams (Fig. 2) provide the summary of the negotiation support payoff results 
(according to formula 4, Appendix 2, and formulas 8–16 and 1), based on optimisation 
rules. They show which negotiator’s offer has the greatest payoff according to different 
optimisation rules, as well as total payoffs of all of the issues. Figure 2 provides the pay-
offs of electronic business negotiation support for each issue according to different opti-
misation rules: Hurwitz, Wald, Savage and Niehaus, Bernoulli-Laplace, Bayes-Laplace, 
Hodges and Lehmann. The use of optimisation rules enables us to simulate various ne-
gotiation situations and find the largest, average and lowest payoffs. The principles and 
rules should be chosen by highly-qualified negotiators that are experienced in their field.
In order to determine, which of the options is the best, we should assess the specifics, 
goals and conditions of each of the tasks, however, in case of multiple negotiations 
and a lot of decision-making, it would be advisable to apply the principles of Bayes 
Fig. 2. The distribution of the negotiation payoffs in attracting investments according  
to different optimisation rules
Hurwitz
Wald
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(Bayes-Laplace) and Hurwitz. If the negotiation is a one-time event, better keep to the 
mini-max and Savage-Niehaus principles. If in certain cases you cannot afford even the 
minimum risk, you should rely on the principle of Wald. If you can afford a partial risk, 
then calculate your optimum strategies according to the rules of Hodges and Lehman. 
The analysis of negotiation strategy support in electronic negotiations shows that the ap-
plication of strategic principles may change with each individual negotiation issue. The 
diagrams illustrating the results showed that the most efficient optimisation rules that 
bring the largest payoffs are that of Savage and Niehaus, while the rule of Wald results 
in the lowest payoff. Accordingly, the rules of Hurwitz, Bernoulli-Laplace and Bayes-
Laplace showed very similar results, while the rules of Hodges and Lehman provided a 
slightly larger payoff than the rule of Wald, which provided the lowest payoff. The total 
payoff results of all of the optimisation rules are provided in the Figure 3.
The participant 1 had the greatest bargaining power, while the bargaining power of his 
competitors was significantly smaller. Although the participant 2 did not use this nego-
tiation support, he managed to conclude a transaction with the participant 1. The results 
of this study reaffirm that the algorithm could be used to support negotiation strategies 
in attracting investments. 
Conclusions
This study tested the model of developing and implementing negotiation strategies and 
its algorithm in a typical situation of international business negotiations: attracting in-
vestments. The study showed that using this algorithm helps to make much more effi-
cient strategic decisions. The efficiency of using the algorithm is also illustrated by the 
fact that the actual bargaining power in the researched field of international business 
deviated from the predicted number by 2.01%.
In order to apply and test the developed strategy preparation model based on bargaining 
power assessment, we conducted an empirical study in a typical international business 
Fig. 3. The total results of the bargaining power assessment of the participants  
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environment – by analysing a case of international trade. The results show that the 
model helped to assess the bargaining power of the interested international business 
subjects and make strategically efficient decisions. It was determined that the use of the 
negotiation strategy model, which is based on bargaining power assessment, allowed 
to make more efficient strategic decisions that without using that model. Therefore, we 
could say that the results reaffirm the first and the second hypothesis. The perspectives 
of using the developed model at international business negotiations include: using the 
model as a measure for negotiation support or reducing information deficit, also as an 
autonomous engine of the negotiation process, for managing large quantities of informa-
tion, as well as for improving communication conditions.
In this paper we developed and defined a model for creating and implementing nego-
tiation strategies, based on bargaining power assessment. The paper also defines the 
empirical study methodology for the application and assessment of the model for prepa-
ring international business negotiation strategies based on bargaining power assessment. 
Research limitations are that this model is tested at the case of attracting investments, 
so it would be useful to adapt and test this model in other typical international business 
negotiation environments: services, transport and logistics, investments, e-trade. 
Based on the conclusions of the study we could say that the model for developing in-
ternational business negotiation strategies may be used for negotiations, which involve 
attracting investments both as an autonomous measure, as well as a measure, which 
partially requires the negotiator’s intervention. This model for developing negotiation 
strategies may be used for negotiation support by using various data bases. The re-
sults of the study may be used in creating international business negotiation strategies, 
taking into account global, international and multicultural cooperation principles. The 
integrated model for supporting decision-making during international business negotia-
tions enables an adequate assessment of the bargaining power of the negotiating and 
interested parties. It also helps to create an integrated view of the factors that actually 
influence the negotiation results, the specifics of cooperation in different countries and 
cultures, as well as optimise the processes of creating and implementing international 
business negotiation strategies with the aim to make the most of the bargaining power 
for international business development under contemporary conditions.
Recently management tasks are usually optimised using heuristic optimisation meth-
ods, based on various paradigms of searching for solutions, which are often developed 
based on analogies with nature, by adapting artificial intelligence technology, etc. The 
application of heuristic algorithms in negotiations is useful for the nature of negotiations 
itself – knowledge of the bargaining power is acquired during the negotiation process 
thus reducing the hindering factor of uncertainty and using the rules of calculating opti-
mum strategies. These tasks may be solved by a number of heuristic algorithms, which 
calculate the optimum possible result that can be achieved in a certain time. Heuristic 
algorithms are used for optimisation and help to achieve high quality. Negotiations are 
based on gradual process of getting more knowledge on the bargaining power of the 
other side of the negotiations, thus, each issue may be solved using different tactics. 
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Therefore, the application of heuristic algorithms may contribute to efficient negotia-
tion management. The principles and rules should be selected by highly-qualified and 
experienced professionals, consultants and negotiators in order to determine, which of 
the options is the best, taking into the account the specifics, goals and conditions of 
each task. The study conducted by the author and its results discussed in this paper only 
reaffirm the conclusion made earlier.
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APPENDIX 1
Specification of research calculations
Table A.1. The matrix of the expert evaluation
Estimation of the significance of the criteria by negotiation expert group
Criteria
Experts 1 2 3 Sum
1 0.1 0.6 0.3 1
2 0.2 0.5 0.3 1
3 0.1 0.6 0.3 1
4 0.2 0.7 0.1 1
5 0.2 0.5 0.3 1
6 0.1 0.5 0.4 1
7 0.2 0.5 0.3 1
8 0.2 0.5 0.3 1
9 0.1 0.6 0.3 1
10 0.2 0.6 0.2 1
Sum 1.6 5.6 2.8 10
Table A.2. The matrix of the expert evaluation rankings
The matrix of the expert evaluation rankings
Criteria
Experts 1 2 3 Sum
1 3 1 2 6
2 3 1 2 6
3 3 1 2 6
4 2 1 3 6
5 3 1 2 6
6 3 1 2 6
7 3 1 2 6
8 3 1 2 6
9 3 1 2 6
10 2 1 2 5
Sum 28 10 21 59
Rank sum average 20 20 20 Sum
Deviation 64 100 1 165
Concordance rate W 0.825  
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Table A.3. Normalised decision-making matrix  










A1R1 1.000 0.960 1.000 0.978
A1R2 1.000 0.941 1.000 0.967
A2R1 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000




Table A.4. Normalised decision-making matrix  












A1R1 1.000 0.911 1.000 0.950
A1R2 1.000 0.955 1.000 0.975
A2R1 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000




Table A.5. Normalised decision-making matrix  










A1R1 1.000 0.790 1.000 0.882
A1R2 1.000 0.857 1.000 0.920
A2R1 1.000 0.927 1.000 0,959
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APPENDIX 2
Formulas for optimisation rules
Wald rule
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where: e – the extent of the risk.
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Concordance coefficient
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where r – the number of experts; m – evaluates the indicators number number.
The value S is calculated as follows:
Calculating assessments made by experts eik each indicator rank-sum ei by the following 
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Value S, rank-sum ei deviations from the general average e  the sum of the squares 
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